In the Sudano-Sahelian region, which includes South Niger, the inter-annual variability of the rainy season is high and irrigation is scarce. As a consequence, bad rainy seasons have a massive impact on crop yield and regularly entail food crises. Traditional insurances based on crop damage assessment are not available because of asymmetric information and high transaction costs compared to the value of production. We assess the risk mitigation capacity of an alternative form of insurance which has been implemented in India since 2003: insurance based on a weather index. We compare the capacity of various weather indices to increase utility of a representative risk-averse farmer. We show the importance of using plot-level yield data rather than village averages, which bias results upward. We also illustrate the need for out-ofsample estimations in order to avoid overfitting. Even with the appropriate index and assuming a substantial risk aversion, we find a limited gain of implementing insurance, roughly corresponding to the cost of implementing such insurances observed in India. However, when we treat separately the plots with and without fertilizers, we show that the benefit of insurance is higher in the former case. This suggests that insurances may increase the use of risk-increasing inputs like fertilizers and improved cultivars, hence average yields, which are very low in the region.
Introduction
During the 1973, 1984 and 1991 droughts in Niger, the productive assets of growers and pastoral households have be largely destroyed (Fewsnet, 2010) . More recently, the sahelian zone suffered from many droughts and the 2005 and 2010 food crisis were mainly triggered by a lack of rainfall or a short rainy season. "During 2004 and 2005 the implications of these underlying vulnerabilities were powerfully demonstrated by a climate shock, with an early end to rains and widespread locust damage" (chapter two of Human Development Report, 2008) .
Traditional agricultural insurance, based on damage assessment cannot efficiently shelter farmers because they suffer from an information asymmetry between the farmer and the insurer, especially moral hazard, and from the cost of damage assessment. An emerging alternative is insurance based on a weather index, which is used as a proxy for crop yield. In such a scheme, the farmer, in a given geographic area, pays an insurance premium every year, and receives an indemnity if the weather index of this area falls below a determined level (the strike). Index based insurance does not suffer from the two shortcomings mentioned above: the weather index provides an objective, and relatively inexpensive, proxy of crop damages. However, its weakness is the basis risk, i.e., the imperfect correlation between the weather index and the yields of farmers contracting the insurance. The basis risk can be considered as the sum of two risks: first, the risk resulting from the index not being a perfect predictor of yield in general (the model basis risk). Second, the spatial basis risk: the index may not capture the weather effectively experienced by the farmer, all the more that the farmer is far from the weather station(s) provides data on which index is calculated.
Niger is the third world producer of millet, succeeding to India and Nigeria. Millet covers almost 70% of its cultivation surface dedicated to cereal (FAO, 2008) and is almost only produced for internal consumption. The prevalence of millet, especially the traditional Haini Kiere cultivar, the one studied in this article, is due to its resistance to drought. Nevertheless, dryness of the region in a context of largely non-irrigated agriculture suggests that water provision could become the major limiting factor.
Very few article in peer reviewed journals have investigated the impact of crop insurance based on weather index in developing or transition countries (Zant, 2008 in India, Breustedt et al., 2008 in Ukraine, Molini et al., 2008 in Ghana, Chantarat et al., 2008 in Kenya and Berg et al., 2009 in Burkina Faso) and ex-post studies (Hill and Viceisza, 2010; Gine, Townsend, and Vickery 2008; Cole et al. 2009; Gine and Yang, 2009 ) are quite limited due to the recent development of such products. However, many reports, recent work or unpublished papers also inquired such topic (Hellmut et al., 2009 and Hazell et al., 2010 that exhaustively lists recent index insurance programmes) even in West Africa (DeBock, 2010) .
This article aims at quantifying the risk pooling capacity of a rainfall index-based insurance by using plot level yields observations matched with a high density rain gauge network. It evaluates the impact of insurance on plot level yields distribution, improving statistical inference as compared to aggregated data. It also illustrates, in this particular case, the necessity to run out-of-sample estimations of insurance ex ante impact to control for overfitting.
We first describe the region and data, then set the insurance policy design and underlying methods to estimate farmers gain. Then we compare overall insurance return to its experienced costs and finally we try to estimate the relative gain for farmers depending on their technical itineraries.
Data and method

Study area
We study the Niamey squared degree area, where are situated thirty meteorological stations (Figure 1 ). High density of meteorological station network is needed for a region known for its high spatial variability of rainfall. We also dispose of four years of yields and other precise agronomic data in ten of the thirty villages. Yield data were collected by Agrhymet between 2004 and 2007 in two plots for each grower, about 30 per village. The first plot is cultivated following traditional technical itineraries and with no additional inputs. From 2005 to 2007 additional mineral fertilizers were freely allocated to growers for applications in a second plot together with agronomical and technical advices from surveyors. There are approximately 30 plots in each of the ten villages. Every plot is situated at less than 3 kilometres away from the nearest meteorological station. We only study in this article the Haini-Kiere (also called HK) millet cultivar, which represents 87% of the plots. The rest of the plots, in which the Somno cultivar was sown, could not be used because Somno has a different cycle duration than HK. Therefore, the growth phases, which are used in some of our indices, differ between HK and Somno. Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the first plots i.e. traditional itineraries that includes 30% of organic fertilization, 8% of mineral fertilization and two percent of farmers are using both in our sample.
There is a high variability of yield distribution across villages (CV=1.7). Intra-village yield variation is even larger (CV=2.1), inducing a likely basis risk stemming from the fact that rainfall is observed at the village level. It is due to a significant occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks, for a large part explained by insects ravages that account for more than 80% of all surveyed non-water-related damages 1 that hit 50% of the whole surveyed growers sample. 
Indemnity schedule
The concept of such scheme is that insurance indemnities are triggered by low values of an underlying index that is supposed to explain yield variation. The indemnity is a step-wise linear function with 3 parameters: the strike (S), i.e. the index level threshold triggering indemnity; the maximum indemnity (M) and λ, the slope-related parameter. When λ equals one, insurance is correspondign to a lump sum transfer to every village where rainfall index fall below the strike level. The strike represents the level at which the meteorological factor becomes limiting. We thus have the following indemnification function depending on x, the meteorological index realization:
Index choice
We first review different indices that could be used in a weather-index insurance, from the simplest to more complex ones. The trade-off, brought up by an emerging literature (Patt et al., 2009) , between accuracy and simplicity of the index would suggest to use the most transparent index among indices reaching similar outcomes. We tested seasonal cumulative rainfall, the number of big rains (defined as superior to 15 and 20 mm.) often quoted by farmers (Roncoli et al., 2002) as a good proxy of yields, Effective Drought Index (EDI, Byun and Wilhite, 1999) computed on a decadal basis and Antecedent Precipitation Index (API, Shinoda et al., 2000) calibrated on a close area with similar characteristics than our study site (Yamagushi and Shinoda, 2002) . Those indices are not studied in the paper because they were quite poor in terms of pooling capacity. We finally retained three different types of indices computed on the Sivakumar (1988) crop growth phase schedule 2 that were performing better in explaining the yields variations.
This growing season schedule is defined by its onset triggered by a minimum level of rainfall (20mm.) occurring in a minimum of three days after Mai the first and its offset triggered by 20 dry days occurred after September the first. Millet first (vegetative) growth phase is triggered by the germination and ends with flowering, the second (reproductive) roughly corresponds to panicle development and the third and fourth (maturation phases), called 'grain filling' phases are corresponding to the development of grains. Indices are displayed here by increasing complexity:
The first is the cumulative rainfall on critical phenological phases. We improved the index by bounding it to a daily maximum (30 mm.) corresponding to an excess of water and cutting off low daily precipitations (< .85 mm. following Odekunle, 2004 ) that are probably entirely evaporated. Bounded Cumulative Rainfall (BCR) for the 4 th crop phenological phase 3 was most clearly fitting observed yields.
We secondly retained the average daily Available Water Resource Index for the same growth phase (AWRI, Byun et al., 2002 ) that takes run-off and soil water stocks into account. It cumulates rainfalls of preceding days (here ten) weighted with an exponentially decreasing factor.
Finally a water balance model (Water Resource Satisfaction Index, FAO/FEWSNET millet, referred as WRSI in the paper) was computed on a daily basis, then averaged on each growth phase. We used Eagleman equation (following Affholder, 1997) to evaluate actual evapotranspiration, as compared to calculated reference crop evapotranspiration (calculated thanks to FAO Penman-Monteith method, Allen et al., 1998) enhanced by multiplying each crop phase by its corresponding FAO coefficients. The moisture ratio is the daily rainfall bounded by a fixed maximum Available Water holding Capacity of soil (AWC=50). We used a sum of critical crop growth phases (namely 1, 3, 4) WRSI. This methodology is predominantly used in existing indexed insurance projects (such as in India and Malawi). Such association of different critical growth phase was also tested for BCR and AWRI, but they did not increase insurance return.
2 The HK cultivar is photoperiodic which obliged us to set sowing and growth phases windows that depends on rainfall distribution during the season. Different growing season schedules were tested but they also were inferior to Sivakumar onset and offset definitions.
3 On a total of 5, corresponding to the grain-filling period at end of the crop cycle.
Parameter optimization
We used a grid optimization process to maximize the objective function. The literature brought multiple different objective functions such as the semi variance (following Vedenov and Barnett, 2004) or the mean-variance criterion. We finally retained the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function in order to compute the certain equivalent income (CEI) and value overall insurance gain. CRRA appears appropriate to describe farmers' behaviours according to Chavas and Holt, 1996 or Pope and Just, 1991 .
Y is the yield distribution, W 0 the initial wealth (representing off-and non-farm revenues, about 40 to 60% of total revenues according to Abdoulaye and Sanders, 2006) and ρ the relative risk aversion parameter. Adding a certain income (W 0 ), the initial wealth, allows the premium to be superior to the lowest yield observation. It lowers the gain from insurance in term of certain equivalent income by increasing the certain part of total income. We set W 0 at a third of the average yield (216kg of millet), lower than the rate proposed by Abdoulaye and Sanders, since those revenues probably also show some uncertainty. We tested a range of values for the relative risk aversion parameter from .5 to 4. This range encompasses the values usually used in the literature in econometric studies (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008) as well as in theoretical or ex ante frameworks in developing countries (Coble et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2004; Carter et al., 2007 and Fafchamps, 2003) . A relative risk aversion of 4 may seem high but empirical estimates of relative risk aversion indicate a wide variation across individuals; therefore, if insurance is not compulsory, only the most risk adverse farmers are likely to be insured, so such a high value is not unrealistic.
We used yields (in kg per ha) as income variable for each observed plot regrouping the 10 villages during 4 consecutive years. Since the use (but also the impact on yields) of costly inputs such as mineral fertilizers is very limited 4 and because a major part of the harvest is used for self consumption, with limited associated price risk, yield in kg/ha is considered a satisfying proxy for on-farm revenue. The insurance contract parameters S, M and λ are optimized in order to maximize the certain equivalent income of equation (2) with the following income after insurance:
Y i is the income after indemnification and Y the income before insurance, P the premium, I the indemnity and x the rainfall index realizations associated with each plot. We bounded the premium range of values to the minimum endowments, in accordance to the choice of the power utility function, only defined on R + . The actuarially fair premium is simply the expected indemnity of the policy given the historical distribution of the weather events. A loading factor is defined as a percentage of total indemnifications on the whole period (fixed at 10% following a private experiment that took place in India, cf. Horréard et al., 2010) and a transaction cost for each indemnification is fixed exogenously to one percent of the average yield. We finally bounded the indemnification rate to a 25% ad-hoc level.
Results
For the two first part of this section we will only consider regular plots (921 observations), representing the traditional technical itineraries for the farmers in this area's growers. The last part will compare different technical itineraries using only 2005-2007, period for which both plots (encouraged and regular) were available.
Plot-level vs. aggregated data
Calibration on the whole sample allows taking intra-village yield variation into consideration, which is rarely the case in such studies due to a lack of quality data at the plot level. In tables 2, 3, and 4 we present for each index the grower average gain from insurance, in certain equivalent income, and insurance parameters depending on risk aversion parameter values. We estimate here the optimal (insample) calibration of contract parameters, taking in the first place the whole sample into account, then only the village average and we finally calibrate insurance parameters on the village average yields and and test it on the whole sample. First we can underline the fact that the strike level (which drives the indemnification rate displayed in Table 2 , 3 and 4) is robust to the risk aversion parameter calibration. No insurance is supplied for BCR and AWRI calibrations when assuming that risk aversion is low (.5). Second calibration with village average leads to overestimation of indemnification level (drived by M), but in the case of BCR for ρ = 1.
Finally high intra-village yield standard deviation increases actual basis risk when working on village average, and thus limits insurance outcome. Taking average value for each village leads to an overestimation of insurance gain when computed with a concave utility function that depends on income distribution and sample size. I our case a misapprehension of village yield distribution therefore lead to a 'bad' calibration of insurance parameters. The presence of village yield heterogeneity within villages could lower the effective gain of an insurance calibrated on village averages.
Need for cross-validation
In the previous section, we optimized the parameters and evaluated the insurance contracts on the same data. This creates a risk of overfitting due to the fact that parameters will not be calibrated and tested on the same sample of data in a real insurance implementation. We can identify such effect by running a cross-validation analysis to avoid the overfitting of input data (as do Vedenov and Barnett, 2004; Berg et al., 2009) . We thus ran a 'leave one (village) out' method, optimizing the 3 parameters of the insurance contract for each village using data from the 9 other villages, for each of the three different indices and on the whole sample of growers first plots. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the relative robustness of out-of-sample estimation as compared to the in sample case. In the in-sample estimations, by construction, the premium equals total indemnities plus 10% (cf. section 2.2 above). Therefore we cannot compare outcomes of insurance contracts simply by comparing the difference in CEI. This is not the case in the out-of-sample estimations, which prevents us from comparing the outcome by simply looking at the CEI gain: the insurer can be better off or worse off than in the corresponding contract optimized with the in sample method 5 .
In-and out-of-sample estimates are displayed in tables 5, 6 and 7. Growers gain in percent CEI is multiplied by the CEI level expressed in kg per hectares. Insurer gain includes the loading factor but not the fix indemnification cost that could be interpreted as a lump-sum transaction cost of indemnification. More specifically, the insurer is better off in out-ofsample calibrations with the AWRI and with WRSI in case of high risk aversion, and worseoff with BCR, and with WRSI in case of low risk aversion. Moreover we cannot simply add the outcomes for the insurer and for the farmers since we did not specify a profit or utility function for the insurer. Since contract parameters are different for each village, the ex post sum of premiums can differ from the total indemnifications, which can lead to a a lower gain for the insurer (AWRI and WRSI for low risk aversion values) but also for farmers (BCR and WRSI for high risk aversion values). We finally found that out-of-sample estimation however limits insurance gain either for the insurer, for growers or even for both of them. Table 6 : Average gain to AWRI insurance depending on risk aversion parameter. Table 7 : Average gain to WRSI insurance depending on risk aversion parameter. 
Potential intensification due to insurance
As pointed out by Zant (2008) our ex ante approach does not take into account the potential intensification due to insurance. Indeed, many agricultural inputs, especially fertilizers, increase the average yield but also the risk, because if the rainy season is bad, the farmer still has to pay for the fertilizers even though the increase in yield will be very limited or even nil. The literature on micro-insurance indeed suggests that the supply of mitigating risk products is often used as an incentive to use more intensive production, directly by lowering the level of risk faced by growers (Hill, 2010), or even induced by a higher credit supply at lower rate (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2007) .
To address the first point we use additional data concerning 'encouragement' plots: where more inputs are used because they were freely allocated by surveyors. Each grower has a 'regular' plot and an 'encouragement' plot, the latter being only available for the [2005] [2006] [2007] period. Our hypothesis is the following: since the cost of a bad rainy season is higher for intensified production insurance gain must be also higher. In such a case insurance should foster intensification therefore bring a higher gain than with a lower level of fertilizers. Table 8 displays the summary statistics, the BCR and the AWRI are in millimeters and the WRSI is the available part (%) of the necessary water resource for the three phases. The average yield is inferior to those of the 2004-2007 period displayed in Table 1 since 2004 was a good rainy season. We valorized production at the annual average market price of millet in Niamey from SIM network 6 in order to compute on-farm income for each plot.
Fertilizers prices are taken from the 'Centrale d'Approvisionnement de la République du Niger'. Quantities are fixed to 40kg per hectares, the average between the minimal level required (20kg/ha) according to Abdoulaye and Sanders (2005) and the maximum (60kg/ha). The incentive to invest in fertilizers is quite low when taking the input costs into account. On-farm income of plots where organic, mineral or both fertilizers were used is about 8% superior in average but with higher variations (corresponding to a CV increase of 13%) compared to regular plots that were grown under traditional technical itineraries. Tables 9 displays the gain from insurance in FCFA for risk averse growers and risk neutral insurer in insample. Gain from insurance is higher in the encouragement plot sample, due to a greater risk in income caused by costly input use. Figures 5, 6 and 7 display the CEI level of an average grower depending on the risk aversion parameter and for both technical itineraries. Arrows shows the threshold level of risk aversion for which it is no more interesting for growers to use costly inputs. Those figures underline the importance to take into account the higher incentive to use costly inputs when insurance is supplied. 
Insurance impact
A totally private experience took place between 2003 and 2009 in 8 districts in India, selling about 34,000 insurance policies without any subsidies (Horréard, et al., 2010) . They are stabilized in 2010 to 10,000 annual insurance policies sold to voluntary farmers (contrarily to mandatory insurance linked with credit products supply) based on a network of 40 weather stations. The average loss ratio for the 6 years is 65%. The total cost of such operation was about US$47,800 among which 30% is dedicated to design and implementation (ICICI Lombard), another 30% to reinsurance (SwissRe) and 40% to distribution (Basix); each of them showing about 10% benefit. The pure operation costs are thus US$7,000 per year also corresponding to US$1.3 per policy sold. In our case a 1% increase in CEI can be valued at about US$2 per hectare when millet is valorized at the period average price (SIM network cf. section 3.3) for the period considered. We found in section 3.2 that the gain from insurance is quite limited in out-of-sample as compared to in-sample estimations. However we also showed in section 3.3 that insurance impact on CEI could be higher when production is intensified, when only considering intensive plots and reasonable risk aversion (say 2) and that a larger part of growers are up to use costly inputs. If insurance actually creates an incentive to intensification, its performance finally could then become significant compared to its cost.
Discussion
The article brings three major conclusions. First it underlines the need to use plot level data to study and get robust estimation of the impact of insurance. Then it uses out-of-sample estimation to show that mis-calibration is a risk either for the insurer or for growers. Finally, by using encouragement to fertilization design, we show that the plot level impact of insurance for pearl millet in Niger is not largely superior as compared to its implementation cost. However, even if our ex-ante estimation cannot rigorously take such impact into account, we suggest that the use of such financial risk transfer product should be accompagnied with credit and/or input supply. It is also the case for imperfect weather forecasts or other complementary tools that are often implemented in order to increase intensification. Insurance outcome is indeed more probably superior to its estimated cost when taking potential intensification into account since it increase the risk taken by growers.
